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On the hierarchical risk-averse control
problems for diffusion processes
Getachew K. Befekadu, Alexander Veremyev and Eduardo L. Pasiliao
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a risk-averse control problem for diffusion processes, in which there
is a partition of the admissible control strategy into two decision-making groups (namely, the leader
and follower) with different cost functionals and risk-averse satisfactions. Our approach, based on a
hierarchical optimization framework, requires that a certain level of risk-averse satisfaction be achieved
for the leader as a priority over that of the follower’s risk-averseness. In particular, we formulate
such a risk-averse control problem involving a family of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures
induced by conditional g-expectations (i.e., filtration-consistent nonlinear expectations associated with
the generators of certain backward stochastic differential equations). Moreover, under suitable conditions,
we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, for
the corresponding risk-averse dynamic programming equations. Finally, we briefly comment on the
implication of our results.
Index Terms
Version – January, 2018
G. K. Befekadu is with the National Research Council, Air Force Research Laboratory & Department of Industrial System
Engineering, University of Florida - REEF, 1350 N. Poquito Rd, Shalimar, FL 32579, USA.
E-mail: gbefekadu@ufl.edu
A. Veremyev is with the Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Systems, University of Central Florida, 12800
Pegasus Dr., Orlando, FL 32816, USA.
E-mail: alexander.veremyev@ucf.edu
E. L. Pasiliao is with the Munitions Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, 101 West Eglin Blvd, Eglin AFB, FL 32542,
USA.
E-mail: pasiliao@eglin.af.mil
2Dynamic programming equation, forward-backward SDEs, hierarchical control, risk-averse control,
value functions, viscosity solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P
)
be a probability space, and let {Bt}t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard
Brownian motion, whose natural filtration, augmented by all P-null sets, is denoted by {Ft}t≥0,
so that it satisfies the usual hypotheses (e.g., see [1] or [2]). We consider the following controlled-
diffusion process over a given finite-time horizon T > 0
dXt = f
(
t, Xt, ut
)
dt+ σ
(
t, Xt, ut
)
dBt, X0 = x, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (1)
where
• X· is an R
d-valued diffusion process,
• u· is a U-valued measurable admissible control process (where U is a compact set in R
d)
such that for all t > s, (Bt−Bs) is independent of ur for r ≤ s (nonanticipativity condition)
and
E
∫ t
s
|uτ |
2dτ <∞, ∀t ≥ s,
• the function f : [0, T ]×Rd×U → Rd is uniformly Lipschitz, with bounded first derivative,
and
• σ : [0, T ]×Rd×U → Rd×d is Lipschitz with the least eigenvalue of σ σT uniformly bounded
away from zero, i.e.,
yTσ(t, x, u) σT (t, x, u)y ≥ λId‖y‖
2, ∀(x, u) ∈ Rd × U, y ∈ Rd, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
for some λ > 0.
In this paper, we specifically consider a hierarchical risk-averse control problem for the above
controlled-diffusion process in (1), in which there is a partition of the admissible control strategy
into two decision making groups (i.e., progressively measurable strategies corresponding to the
leader and follower – where such notions are used in the Stackelberg’s optimization [3]) with
different cost functionals and risk-averse satisfactions. In particular, we partition the control
subdomain U into two open sets V and W that are compatible with the strategy subspaces of
3the leader and the follower, respectively. More specifically, the risk-averse strategy for the leader
v· is a V -valued measurable control process from the set V[0,T ] with
V[0,T ] ,
{
v : [0, T ]× Ω→ V
∣∣∣v is an {Ft}t≥0- adapted and E
∫ T
0
|vt|
2dt <∞
}
(2)
and the risk-averse strategy for the follower w· is a W -valued measurable control process from
the set W[0,T ] with
W[0,T ] ,
{
w : [0, T ]× Ω→ W
∣∣∣w is an {Ft}t≥0- adapted and E
∫ T
0
|wt|
2dt <∞
}
, (3)
respectively.
Furthermore, we consider the following two cost functionals that provide information about the
accumulated risk-costs on the time interval [0, T ] w.r.t. the strategies of the leader and that of
the follower, i.e.,
leader’s accumulated risk-cost:
ξ10,T (v, w) =
∫ T
0
c1
(
t, Xt, vt
)
dt+ Ψ1(XT ) (4)
and
follower’s accumulated risk-cost:
ξ20,T (v, w) =
∫ T
0
c2
(
t, Xt, wt
)
dt+Ψ2(XT ), (5)
where the cost-rate functionals c1 : [0, T ] × R
d × V → R and c2 : [0, T ] × R
d ×W → R are
measurable functions; and Ψi : R
d → R, with i = 1, 2, are the final-stage risk-costs (that are
associated with risk-averse satisfaction levels) and they are assumed to be measurable functions.
Here, we also assume that f , σ, ci and Ψi, i = 1, 2, satisfy the following growth conditions∣∣f(t, x, (v, w))∣∣+ ∣∣σ(t, x, (v, w))∣∣+ ∣∣c1(t, x, v)∣∣+ ∣∣Ψ1(x)∣∣
≤ K
(
1 +
∣∣x∣∣p + ∣∣v∣∣+ ∣∣w∣∣) (6)
and ∣∣f(t, x, (v, w))∣∣+ ∣∣σ(t, x, (v, w))∣∣ + ∣∣c2(t, x, w)∣∣+ ∣∣Ψ2(x)∣∣
≤ K
(
1 +
∣∣x∣∣p + ∣∣v∣∣+ ∣∣w∣∣), (7)
for all
(
t, x, (v, w)
)
∈ [0, T ]×Rd× (V ×W ), p ≥ 1 and for some constant K > 0. Note that the
corresponding solution Xt in (1) (i.e., Xt = X
0,x;u
t with u· ≡ (v·, w·) ∈ V[0,T ] ×W[0,T ]) depends
4on the admissible risk-averse strategies of the leader and that of the follower; and, moreover,
it also depends on the initial condition X0 = x. As a result of this, for any time-interval [t, T ],
with t ∈ [0, T ], the accumulated risk-costs ξ1t,T and ξ
2
t,T depend on the risk-averse strategies
(v·, w·) ∈ V[t,T ] ×W[t,T ].
Next, let us introduce the following measurable spaces that will be useful later in the paper.
• L2
(
Ω,Ft,P;R
d
)
is the set of Rd-valued Ft-measurable random variables ξ such that
∥∥ξ∥∥2 =
E
{∣∣ξ∣∣2} <∞;
• L∞
(
Ω,Ft,P
)
is the set of R-valued Ft-measurable random variables ξ such that
∥∥ξ∥∥ =
ess inf
∣∣ξ∣∣ <∞;
• S2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
is the set of Rd-valued adapted processes
(
ϕs
)
t≤s≤T
on Ω × [t, T ] such that∥∥ϕ∥∥2
[t,T ]
= E
{
supt≤s≤T
∣∣ϕs∣∣2} <∞;
• H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
is the set of Rd-valued progressively measurable processes
(
ϕs
)
t≤s≤T
such
that
∥∥ϕ∥∥2
[t,T ]
= E
{∫ T
t
∣∣ϕs∣∣2ds} <∞.
On the same probability space
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P
)
, we consider the following one-dimensional
backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE)
−dYt = g
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
dt− ZtdBt, YT = ξ, (8)
where the terminal value YT = ξ belongs to L
2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
and the generator function g : Ω×
[0, T ]×R× Rd → R, with property that
(
g
(
t, y, z
))
0≤t≤T
is progressively measurable for each
(y, z) ∈ R× Rd. We also assume that g satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1.1:
(A1) g is Lipschitz in (y, z), i.e., there exists a constantK > 0 such that, P-a.s., for any t ∈ [0, T ],
y1, y2 ∈ R and z1, z2 ∈ R
d
∣∣g(t, y1, z1)− g(t, y2, z2)∣∣ ≤ K(∣∣y1 − y2∣∣ + ∥∥z1 − z2∥∥).
(A2) g
(
t, 0, 0
)
∈ H2
(
t, T ;R
)
.
(A3) P-a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ] and y ∈ R, g
(
t, y, 0
)
= 0.
5Then, we state the following lemma, which is used to establish the existence of a unique adapted
solution (e.g., see [4] for additional discussions).
Lemma 1.2: Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds. Then, for any ξ ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
, the BSDE
in (8), with terminal condition YT = ξ, i.e.,
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
g
(
s, Ys, Zs
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdBs, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (9)
has a unique adapted solution
(
Y T,g,ξt , Z
T,g,ξ
t
)
0≤t≤T
∈ S2
(
0, T ;R
)
×H2
(
0, T ;Rd
)
. (10)
Moreover, we recall the following comparison result that will be useful later (e.g., see [5]).
Theorem 1.3: Given two generators g1 and g2 satisfying Assumption 1.1 and two terminal con-
ditions ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L
2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
. Let
(
Y 1t , Z
1
t
)
and
(
Y 2t , Z
2
t
)
be the solution pairs corresponding
to
(
ξ1, g1
)
and
(
ξ2, g2
)
, respectively. Then, we have
(i) Monotonicity: If ξ1 ≥ ξ2 and g1 ≥ g2, P-a.s., then Y
1
t ≥ Y
2
t , P-a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) Strictly Monotonicity: In addition to (i) above, if we assume that P
(
ξ1 > ξ2
)
> 0, then
P
(
Y 1t > Y
2
t
)
> 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
In the following, we give a definition for a dynamic risk measure that is associated with the
generator of the BSDE in (8).
Definition 1.4: For any ξ ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
, let
(
Y T,g,ξt , Z
T,g,ξ
t
)
0≤t≤T
∈ S2
(
0, T ;R
)
×H2
(
0, T ;Rd
)
be the unique solution to the BSDE in (8) with terminal condition YT = ξ. Then, we define the
dynamic risk measure ρgt,T of ξ by
1
ρgt,T
[
ξ
]
, Y T,g,ξt . (11)
1Note that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], the conditional g-expectation of ξ ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
w.r.t. Ft (denoted by Eg
[
ξ|Ft
]
(e.g., see
[6] or [7]; cf. [8])) is also defined by
Eg
[
ξ|Ft
]
, Y
T,g,ξ
t .
Moreover, if ξ is Ft-measurable, then we have Eg
[
ξ|Ft
]
= ξ.
6Note that such a risk measure is widely used for evaluating the risk of stochastic processes
or uncertain outcomes, and assists with stipulating minimum interventions required by financial
institutions for risk management (e.g., see [9], [7], [10], [11], [12] or [13] for related discussions).
In Section II, we use a family of dynamic risk measures associated that takes into account the
leader’s and follower’s cost functionals and risk-averse satisfactions; and we further provide a
hierarchical framework for the risk-averse control problem.
Moreover, if the generator function g satisfies Assumption 1.1, then a family of time-consistent
dynamic risk measures
{
ρgt,T
}
t∈[0,T ]
has the following properties (e.g., see [7] for additional
discussions).
Property 1:
(P1) Normalization: ρgt,T
[
0
]
= 0 for t ∈ [0, T ],
(P2) Monotonicity: For ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L
2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
such that ξ1 ≥ ξ2 P-a.s., then
ρgt,T
[
ξ1
]
≥ ρgt,T
[
ξ2
]
, P-a.s.,
(P3) Translation Invariance: For all ξ ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
and ν ∈ L2
(
Ω,Ft,P;R
)
ρgt,T
[
ξ + ν
]
= ρgt,T
[
ξ
]
+ ν,
(P4) Convexity: If g is a convex function for every fixed (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, then for all ξ1, ξ2 ∈
L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
and for all λ ∈ L∞
(
Ω,Ft,P;R
)
such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
ρgt,T
[
λξ1 + (1− λ)ξ2
]
≤ λρgt,T
[
ξ1
]
+ (1− λ)ρgt,T
[
ξ1
]
,
(P5) Positive Homogeneity: If g is positive-homogeneous, then, for all ξ ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
and
for all λ ∈ L∞
(
Ω,Ft,P;R
)
such that λ > 0
ρgt,T
[
λξ
]
= λρgt,T
[
ξ
]
.
Remark 1.5: Note that, since the seminal work of Artzner et al. [9], there have been studies on
axiomatic dynamic risk measures, coherency and consistency in the literature (e.g., see [12], [7],
[6], [11] or [13]). Particularly relevant for us is a family of time-consistent dynamic convex risk
7measures, based on the conditional g-expectations associated with the generators of BSDEs in
(19) and (20), that satisfy the above properties (P1)–(P5).
Here, it is worth mentioning that some interesting studies on the dynamic risk measures, based
on the conditional g-expectations, have been reported in the literature (e,g. see [7], [13] and
[6] for establishing connection between the risk measures and the generator of BSDE; and
see also [14] for characterizing the generator of BSDE according to different risk measures).
Recently, the authors in [15] and [16] (see also [17]) have provided interesting results on the risk-
averse control problem for Markov decision processes, in discrete-time setting, and, respectively,
for controlled-diffusion processes in continuous-time framework. Note that the rationale behind
our framework, which follows in some sense the settings of these papers, is to show how a
hierarchical optimization framework can be systematically used to obtain optimal risk-averse
strategies for such controlled-diffusion processes.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, using the basic remarks
made in Section I, we state the risk-averse control problem for the controlled-diffusion process.
In Section III, we present our main results – where we introduce a framework under which
the follower is required to respond optimally to the risk-averse strategy of the leader so as to
achieve an overall optimal risk-averseness. In this section, we also establish the existence of
optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, to the associated risk-averse
dynamic programming equations. Finally, Section IV provides further remarks.
II. THE HIERARCHICAL RISK-AVERSE CONTROL PROBLEM FORMULATION
In order to make our formulation more precise, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd, we consider the
following forward SDE with an initial condition X t,x;ut = x
dX t,x;us =f
(
t, X t,x;us , (vs, ws)
)
ds+ σ
(
s,X t,x;us , (vs, ws)
)
dBs, t ≤ s ≤ T, (12)
2In this paper, our intent is to provide a theoretical framework, rather than considering a specific numerical problem or
application.
8where v· and w· are V - and W -valued measurable control processes, respectively. Moreover, we
introduce the following two risk-value functions w.r.t. the strategies of the leader and that of the
follower, i.e.,
leader: V v1
(
t, x
)
= ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
v, wˆ
)]
,
such that
wˆ ∈
{
w˜· ∈ W[t,T ]
∣∣∣ ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T (v, w˜)]≤ ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T(v, w)],
∀w· ∈ W[t,T ], v· ∈ V[t,T ], P− a.s.
}
, (13)
where
ξ1t,T
(
v, wˆ
)
=
∫ T
t
c1
(
s,X t,x;us , vs
)
ds+Ψ1(X
t,x;u
T ), (14)
with u = (v, wˆ); and similarly
follower: V w2
(
t, x
)
= ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
vˆ, w
)]
, (15)
where vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ] is assumed to be known to the follower and
ξ2t,T
(
vˆ, w
)
=
∫ T
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
ds+Ψ2(X
t,x;u
T ), (16)
with u = (vˆ, w).
Note that we can express the above risk-value functions in (13) and (15) as follow
V v1
(
t, x
)
= ξ1t,T
(
v, wˆ
)
+
∫ T
t
g1
(
s, Y 1;t,x;us , Z
1;t,x;u
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Z1;t,x;us dBs
= Ψ1(X
t,x;u
T ) +
∫ T
t
{
c1
(
s,X t,x;us , vs
)
+ g1
(
s, Y 1;t,x;us , Z
1;t,x;u
s
)}
ds−
∫ T
t
Z1;t,x;us dBs,
(17)
with u = (v, wˆ) and wˆ ∈
{
w˜· ∈ W[t,T ]
∣∣∣ ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T (v, w˜)]≤ ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T (v, w)], ∀w· ∈ W[t,T ], v· ∈
V[t,T ]
}
, and
V w2
(
t, x
)
= ξ2t,T
(
vˆ, w
)
+
∫ T
t
g2
(
s, Y 2;t,x;us , Z
2;t,x;u
s
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Z2;t,x;us dBs
= Ψ2(X
t,x;u
T ) +
∫ T
t
{
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
+ g2
(
s, Y 2;t,x;us , Z
2;t,x;u
s
)}
ds−
∫ T
t
Z2;t,x;us dBs,
(18)
with u = (vˆ, w) – where the generators g1 and g2 are assumed to satisfy Assumption 1.1. Further,
noting the conditions in (6) and (7), then
(
Y 1;t,x;us , Z
1;t,x;u
s
)
t≤s≤T
and
(
Y 2;t,x;us , Z
2;t,x;u
s
)
t≤s≤T
are
9adapted solutions on [t, T ]×Ω and belong to S2
(
t, T ;R
)
×H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
. Equivalently, we can also
rewrite (17) and (18) as a family of coupled BSDEs on the probability space
(
Ω,F ,P, {Ft}t≥0),
i.e.,
−dY 1;t,x;us =
{
c1
(
s,X t,x;us , vs
)
+ g1
(
s, Y 1;t,x;us , Z
1;t,x;u
s
)}
ds
− Z1;t,x;us dBs, s ∈ [t, T ], Y
1
T = Ψ1(X
t,x;u
T ) (19)
and
−dY 2;t,x;us =
{
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
+ g2
(
s, Y 2;t,x;us , Z
2;t,x;u
s
)}
ds
− Z2;t,x;us dBs, s ∈ [t, T ], Y
2
T = Ψ2(X
t,x;u
T ). (20)
In what follows, we introduce a hierarchical optimization framework that requires a certain level
of risk-averse satisfaction be achieved for the leader as a priority over that of the follower’s
risk-averseness. For example, suppose that the risk-averse strategy of the leader vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ]
is given.3 Then, the problem of finding an optimal risk-averse strategy for the follower, i.e.,
wˆ· ∈ W[t,T ], which minimizes the accumulated risk-cost under w is then reduced to finding an
optimal risk-averse solution for
inf
w·∈W[t,T ]
J2
[(
vˆ, w
)]
, (21)
where
J2
[(
vˆ, w
)]
= ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
vˆ, w
)]
. (22)
Note that, for a given vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ], if the forward-backward stochastic differential equations
(FBSDEs) in (12), (19) and (20) admit weak solutions, then we have
wˆ ∈ S(vˆ) ⊂
{
w˜· ∈ W[t,T ]
∣∣∣ ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T (vˆ, w˜)]≤ ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T(vˆ, w)], ∀w· ∈ W[t,T ], P− a.s.} (23)
for some (nonanticipating) measurable mapping S : V[t,T ] ⇒W[t,T ]. Furthermore, if we substitute
u = (vˆ, S(vˆ)) into (12), then the corresponding solution X t,x;us depends uniformly on vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ]
for s ∈ [t, T ].4 Moreover, the risk-averse control problem (which minimizes the accumulated
3Note that such a risk-averse strategy is also assumed to guarantee the leader a certain value of accumulated risk-cost that
can not be exceeded, no matter what the follower’s rational-response (see also Section IV).
4In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we use the same notation to represent both the set in (23) and an element of that
set which is uniquely selectable.
10
risk-cost under v w.r..t the leader) is then reduced to finding an optimal risk-averse solution
for
inf
v·∈V[t,T ]
J1
[(
v, S(v)
)]
, (24)
where
J1
[(
v, S(v)
)]
= ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
v, S(v)
)]
. (25)
Next, we introduce the definition of admissible hierarchical risk-averse control system Σ[t,T ]
which provides a logical construct for our main results (e.g., see [18]).
Definition 2.1: For a given finite-time horizon T > 0, we call Σ[t,T ] an admissible hierarchical
risk-averse control system, if it satisfies the following conditions:
•
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P
)
is a complete probability space;
•
{
Bs
}
s≥t
is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on
(
Ω,F ,P
)
over [t, T ] and
F t ,
{
F ts
}
s∈[t,T ]
, where F ts = σ
{(
Bs; t ≤ s ≤ T
)}
is augmented by all P-null sets in F ;
• v· : Ω × [s, T ] → V and w· : Ω× [s, T ]→ W are
{
F ts
}
s≥t
-adapted processes on
(
Ω,F ,P
)
with
E
∫ T
s
|vτ |
2dτ <∞ and E
∫ T
s
|wτ |
2dτ <∞, s ∈ [t, T ];
• There exists at least one measurable mapping S : V[t,T ] ⇒W[t,T ] with w· ∈ S
(
v·
)
whenever
v· ∈ V[t,T ];
• For any x ∈ Rd, the FBSDEs in (12), (19) and (20) admit a unique solution set{
Xs,x;u· , (Y
1;s,x;u
· , Z
1;s,x;u
· ), (Y
2;s,x;u
· , Z
2;s,x;u
· )
}
on
(
Ω,F ,F t,P
)
with u =
(
v, S(v)
)
.
Then, for the admissible hierarchical risk-averse control system Σ[0,T ], we can state the problem
of risk-averse control as follow.
Problem (P). Find a pair of risk-averse strategies (v∗· , w
∗
· ) ∈ V[0,T ]×W[0,T ] w.r.t. the leader and
that of the follower such that
v∗· ∈
{
arg inf J1
[(
v, w
)]∣∣∣w· ∈ S(v·) & (v·, S(v·)) restricted to Σ[0,T ]} ⊂ V[0,T ] (26)
and
w∗· ∈
{
arg inf J2
[(
v, w
)]∣∣∣w· ∈ S(v·) & (v·, S(v·)) restricted toΣ[0,T ]} ⊂ W[0,T ] (27)
11
where S is a unique measurable mapping that maps V[0,T ] onto W[0,T ] and, furthermore, the
accumulated risk-costs J1 and J2 over the time-interval [0, T ] are given
J1
[(
v∗, w∗
)]
=
∫ T
0
c1
(
s,X0,x;u
∗
s , vs
)
ds+Ψ1(X
0,x;u∗
T ) (28)
and
J2
[(
v∗, w∗
)]
=
∫ T
0
c2
(
s,X0,x;u
∗
s , ws
)
ds+Ψ2(X
0,x;u∗
T ), (29)
where X0,x;u
∗
0 = x and u
∗ = (v∗, w∗), with w∗· ∈ S(v
∗
· ).
In the following section, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense
of viscosity solutions, for the optimization problems in (26) and (27) with restriction to Σ[0,T ].
Note that, for a given v· ∈ V[0,T ], the optimization problem in (27) has a unique solution on
W[0,T ] (see Proposition 3.7). Furthermore, as we will see later (particularly in Proposition 3.9),
the problem in (26) makes sense if the follower is involved not only in minimizing his own
accumulated risk-cost (in response to the risk-averse strategy of the leader) but also in minimizing
that of the leader.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results, where we establish the existence of optimal risk-
averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, to the associated risk-averse dynamic
programming equations (cf. equations (48) and (69)).
We now state the following propositions that will be useful for proving our main results later in
Subsections III-A and III-B.
Proposition 3.1: Suppose Assumption 1.1 together with (6) and (7) hold. Then, for any (t, x) ∈
[0, T ] × Rd and for every (v·, w·) ∈ V[t,T ] × W[t,T ], the FBSDEs in (12), (19) and (20) admit
unique adapted solutions
X t,x;u· ∈ S
2
(
t, T ;R
)
(
Y 1;t,x;u· , Z
1;t,x;u
·
)
∈ S2
(
t, T ;R
)
×H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
(
Y 2;t,x;u· , Z
2;t,x;u
·
)
∈ S2
(
t, T ;R
)
×H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)


(30)
Furthermore, the risk-values w.r.t. the leader and follower, i.e., V v1
(
t, x
)
and V w2
(
t, x
)
, are
deterministic.
12
Proof: Notice that f and σ are bounded and Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd
and uniformly for (v, w) ∈ V × W . Then, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and u· = (v·, w·)
are progressively measurable processes, there always exists a unique path-wise solution X t,x;u· ∈
S2
(
t, T ;R
)
for the forward SDE in (12). On the other hand, consider the following BSDEs
−dYˆ 1;t,x;us = g1
(
s, Z1;t,x;us
)
ds− Z1;t,x;us dBs, (31)
where
Yˆ 1;t,x;uT =
∫ T
t
c1
(
τ,X t,x;uτ , vτ
)
dτ +Ψ1(X
t,x;u
T )
and
−dYˆ 2;t,x;us = g2
(
s, Z2;t,x;us
)
ds− Z2;t,x;us dBs, (32)
where
Yˆ 2;t,x;uT =
∫ T
t
c2
(
τ,X t,x;uτ , wτ
)
dτ +Ψ2(X
t,x;u
T ).
From Lemma 1.2, the equations in (31) and (32) admit unique solutions
(
Yˆ 1;t,x;u· , Z
1;t,x;u
·
)
and(
Yˆ 2;t,x;u· , Z
2;t,x;u
·
)
in S2
(
t, T ;R
)
×H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
. Furthermore, if we introduce the following
Y 1;t,x;us = Yˆ
1;t,x;u
s −
∫ s
t
c1
(
τ,X t,x;uτ , vτ
)
dτ, s ∈ [t, T ]
and
Y 2;t,x;us = Yˆ
2;t,x;u
s −
∫ s
t
c2
(
τ,X t,x;uτ , wτ
)
dτ, s ∈ [t, T ].
Then, the forward SDEs in (19) and (20) hold, with
(
Y 1;t,x;u· , Z
1;t,x;u
·
)
and
(
Y 2;t,x;u· , Z
2;t,x;u
·
)
,
respectively. Moreover, we also observe that Y 1;t,x;ut and Y
2;t,x;u
t are deterministic. This completes
the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.2: Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd and (v·, w·) ∈ V[t,T ] ×W[t,T ] be restricted to Σ[t,T ] (cf.
Definition 2.1). Then, for any r ∈ [t, T ] and Rd-valued F tr-measurable random variable η, we
have
V v1
(
r, η
)
= ρg1r,T
[∫ T
r
c1
(
s,Xr,η;us , vs
)
ds+Ψ1(X
r,η;u
T )
]
, P-a.s. (33)
and
V w2
(
r, η
)
= ρg2r,T
[∫ T
r
c2
(
s,Xr,η;us , ws
)
ds+Ψ2(X
r,η;u
T )
]
, P-a.s. (34)
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Proof: For any r ∈ [t, T ], with t ∈ [0, T ], we consider the following probability space
(
Ω,F ,P
(
·|F tr
)
, {F t}
)
and notice that η is deterministic under this probability space. Then, for any s ≥ r, there exist
progressively measurable processes ψ1 and ψ2 such that(
vs(Ω), ws(Ω)
)
=
(
ψ1(Ω, B·∧s(Ω)), ψ2(Ω, B·∧s(Ω))
)
,
=
(
ψ1(s, B¯·∧s(Ω) +Br(Ω)), ψ2(s, B¯·∧s(Ω) +Br(Ω))
)
, (35)
where B¯s = Bs −Br is a standard d-dimensional brownian motion. Note that the pairs
(
v·, w·
)
are F tr-adapted processes, then we have the following restriction w.r.t. Σ[t,T ](
Ω,F , {F t},P
(
·|F tr
)
(ω′), B·,
(
v·, w·
))
∈ Σ[t,T ], (36)
where ω′ ∈ Ω′ such that Ω′ ∈ F , with P(Ω′) = 1. Furthermore, noting Lemma 1.2, if we
work under the probability space
(
Ω′,F ,P
(
·|F tr
))
, then both statements in (33) and (34) hold
P-almost surely. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.2.
In what follows, we restrict our discussion when the generators g1 and g2 depend only on
(t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd. Moreover, for (v, w) ∈ V ×W and any φ(x) ∈ C∞0 (R
d), we introduce the
following second-order linear operators5, associated with (12), as follows
Lvtφ(x) =
1
2
tr
{
av(t, x)D2xφ(x)
}
+ f(t, x, (v, S(v)))Dxφ(x), t ∈ [0, T ], (37)
where av(t, x) = σ(t, x, (v, S(v)))σT (t, x, (v, S(v))) and S is the mapping that satisfies (23);
and
Lˆwt φ(x) =
1
2
tr
{
aw(t, x)D2xφ(x)
}
+ f(t, x, (v, w))Dxφ(x), t ∈ [0, T ], (38)
where aw(t, x) = σ(t, x, (v, w))σT (t, x, (v, w)), Dx and D
2
x, (with D
2
x =
(
∂2/∂xi∂xj
)
) are
the gradient and the Hessian (w.r.t. the variable x), respectively. Furthermore, on the space
C1,2b ([t, T ] × R
d), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd, we consider the following coupled Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equations
∂ϕ1(t, x)
∂t
+ infv∈V
{
c1
(
t, x, v
)
+ Lvtϕ1(t, x)
+g1
(
t, Dxϕ1(t, x) · σ(t, x, (v, S(v)))
)}
= 0

 (39)
5The operators Lvt and Lˆ
w
t are parameterized w.r.t. v and w, respectively.
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and
∂ϕ2(t, x)
∂t
+ infw∈W
{
c2
(
t, x, w
)
+ Lˆwt ϕ2(t, x)
+g2
(
t, Dxϕ2(t, x) · σ(t, x, (vˆ, w))
)}
= 0
where vˆ is assumed to be given


(40)
with, respectively, the following boundary conditions
ϕ1(T, x) = Ψ1(T, x) and ϕ2(T, x) = Ψ2(T, x), x ∈ R
d. (41)
Note that the above equations in (39) and (40) together with (41), are associated with the risk-
averse control problem w.r.t. the leader and follower, restricted to Σ[t,T ], with cost functionals
in (28) and (29). Moreover, they represent generalized HJB equations with additional terms g1
and g2, respectively. Note that the problem of FBSDEs (cf. equations (12), (19) and (20)) and
the solvability of the corresponding HJB partial differential equations have been well studied in
literature (e.g., see [19], [20], [18], [21], [5], [22] and [23]).
Next, we recall the definitions of viscosity solutions for (39) and (40) together with (41) (e.g.,
see [24], [25] or [26] for additional discussions on the notion of viscosity solutions).
Definition 3.3: The functions ϕi : [0, T ]×R
d, with i = 1, 2, are viscosity solutions for (39) and
(40) together with the boundary conditions in (41), if the following conditions hold
(i) for every ψi ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ],×R
d), with i = 1, 2, such that ψi ≥ ϕi on [0, T ]× R
d,
sup
(t,x)
{
ϕi(t, x)− ψi(t, x)
}
= 0, (42)
and for (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × R
d such that ψi(t0, x0) = ϕi(t0, x0) (i.e., a local maximum at
(t0, x0)), then we have
∂ψ1(t0, x0)
∂t
+ inf
v∈V
{
c1
(
t0, x0, v
)
+ Lvtψ1(t0, x0)
+ g1
(
t0, Dxψ1(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, (v, S(v)))
)}
≥ 0 (43)
and
∂ψ2(t0, x0)
∂t
+ inf
w∈W
{
c2
(
t0, x0, w
)
+ Lˆwt ψ2(t0, x0)
+ g2
(
t0, Dxψ2(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, (v, w))
)}
≥ 0 (44)
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(ii) for every ψi ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ],×R
d), with i = 1, 2, such that ψi ≤ ϕi on [0, T ]× R
d,
inf
(t,x)
{
ϕi(t, x)− ψi(t, x)
}
= 0, (45)
and for (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × R
d such that ψi(t0, x0) = ϕi(t0, x0) (i.e., a local minimum at
(t0, x0)), then we have
∂ψ1(t0, x0)
∂t
+ inf
v∈V
{
c1
(
t0, x0, v
)
+ Lvtψ1(t0, x0)
+ g1
(
t0, Dxψ1(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, (v, S(v)))
)}
≤ 0 (46)
and
∂ψ2(t0, x0)
∂t
+ inf
w∈W
{
c2
(
t0, x0, w
)
+ Lˆwt ψ2(t0, x0)
+ g2
(
t0, Dxψ2(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, (v, w))
)}
≤ 0. (47)
A. On the risk-averse optimality condition for the follower
Note that, for a given vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ] (i.e., a risk-averse strategy for the leader’s with restriction
to Σ[t,T ]), if the risk-averse strategy for the follower is an optimal solution to (18) (cf. equa-
tions (15) and (27)), then such a solution is characterized by the following propositions (i.e.,
Propositions 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7).
Proposition 3.4: Suppose that Assumption 1.1 together with (6) and (7) hold. Let vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ] be
given, then the risk-value function w.r.t. the follower is given by
V w2
(
t, x
)
= inf
w·∈W[t,r]
∣∣Σ[t,T ] ρ
g2
t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
ds+ V w2
(
r,X t,x;ur
)]
(48)
for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd and r ∈ [t, T ], with u = (vˆ, w).
Proof: Notice that vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ] is given. Then, for any ǫ > 0, there exists w˜· ∈ W[t,T ] such
that V w2
(
t, x
)
+ ǫ ≥ V w˜2
(
t, x
)
. Further, if we applying the properties of time-consistency and
translation (cf. Property 1) to V w˜2
(
t, x
)
, then we have
V w2
(
t, x
)
+ ǫ ≥ V w˜2
(
t, x
)
= ρg2t,r
[
ρg2r,T
[∫ T
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds+Ψ2(X
t,x;u˜
T )
]]
= ρg2t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds
+ ρg2r,T
[∫ T
r
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds+Ψ2(X
t,x;u˜
T )
]]
, (49)
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where u˜· = (vˆ·, w˜·) is restricted to Σ[t,T ]. Moreover, if we apply Proposition 3.2, then we
have
V w2
(
t, x
)
+ ǫ ≥ ρg2t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds+ V w˜2
(
r,X t,x;u˜r
)]
≥ ρg2t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds+ V w2
(
r,X t,x;u˜r
)]
≥ inf
w·∈W[t,r]
∣∣Σ[t,T ] ρ
g2
t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds+ V w2
(
r,X t,x;ur
)]
. (50)
Since ǫ is arbitrary, we obtain (48). On the other hand, to show the reverse inequality “ ≤ ”,
let w˜· (which is restricted to Σ[t,T ]) be an ǫ-optimal solution, for some fixed ǫ > 0, to the the
problem on the right-hand side of (48).That is,
inf
w·∈W[t,r]
∣∣Σ[t,T ] ρ
g2
t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds+ V w2
(
r,X t,x;ur
)]
+ǫ ≥ ρg2t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u˜s , w˜s
)
ds+ V w2
(
r,X t,x;u˜r
)]
. (51)
Then, for every y ∈ Rd, let w˜·(y) ∈ W[t,T ] be such that V
w
2
(
r, y
)
+ǫ ≥ V
w˜(y)
2
(
t, x
)
and restricted
to Σ[t,T ]. Due to the measurable selection theorem (e.g., see [27, Theorem I.7.7, pp. 161]), we
may assume that the function y → w˜(y) is Borel measurable. Further, suppose that a control
function w0· is defined as follow
w0s =

 w¯s, s ∈ [t, r)w˜s(X t,x;u¯s ), s ∈ [r, T ]. (52)
Note that, from the above definition, w0· is restricted to Σ[t,T ]. Then, using the properties of the
monotonicity, translation and time-consistency, we obtain the following
ρg2t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u¯s , w¯s
)
ds+ V w¯2
(
r,X t,x;u¯r
)]
≥ ρg2t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u¯s , w¯s
)
ds+ V
w˜s(X
t,x;u¯
s )
2
(
r,X t,x;u¯r
)
− ǫ
]
,
with u¯ = (vˆ, w¯)
≥ ρg2t,T
[∫ T
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;u
0
s , w¯
0
s
)
ds+Ψ2
(
X t,x;u
0
T
)]
− ǫ,
with u0 = (vˆ, w0)
= V w
0
2
(
t, x
)
− ǫ. (53)
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If we further combine the inequalities from (51) and (53), then we have
inf
w·∈W[t,r]
∣∣Σ[t,T ] ρ
g2
t,r
[∫ r
t
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
ds+ V w2
(
r,X t,x;ur
)]
+ ǫ ≥ V w
0
2
(
t, x
)
− ǫ
≥ V w2
(
t, x
)
− ǫ. (54)
Note that, since ǫ is arbitrary, we obtain (48). This completes the proof of Proposition 3.4.
Then, we have the following results (i.e., Propositions 3.5 and 3.7) that are useful to characterize
the mapping S in (23).
Proposition 3.5: Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds and let W be a compact set in Rd. Let
vˆ· ∈ V[t,T ] be given, then the risk-value function V
w
2
(
·, ·
)
is the viscosity solution of (40) with
boundary condition Ψ2(T, x) for x ∈ R
d and with u = (vˆ, w).
Proof: Suppose that ϕ2 ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ] × R
d) and assume that ϕ2 ≥ V
w
2 on [0, T ] × R
d and
max(t,x)
[
V w2 (t, x)−ϕ2(t, x)
]
= 0. We consider a point (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]×R
d so that ϕ2(t0, x0) =
V w2 (t0, x0) (i.e., a local maximum at (t0, x0)). Further, for a small δt > 0, we consider a constant
control ws = α for s ∈ [t0, t0 + δt]. Then, from (48), we have
ϕ2(t0, x0) = V
w
2 (t0, x0)
≤ ρg2t0,t0+δt
[∫ t0+δt
t0
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
ds+ V w2 (t0 + δt,X
t0,x0;u
t0+δt
)
]
≤ ρg2t0,t0+δt
[∫ t0+δt
t0
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
ds+ ϕ2(t0 + δt,X
t0,x0;u
t0+δt
)
]
, with u = (vˆ, α).
(55)
Using the translation property of ρt0,t0+δt[ · ], we obtain the following inequality
ρg2t0,t0+δt
[∫ t0+δt
t0
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
ds+ ϕ2(t0 + δt,X
t0,x0;u
t0+δt
)− ϕ2(t0, x0)
]
≥ 0. (56)
Notice that ϕ2 ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ]× R
d), then, using the Itoˆ formula, we can evaluate the difference
between ϕ2(t0 + δt,X
t0,x0;u
t0+δt
) and ϕ2(t0, x0) as follow
ϕ2(t0 + δt,X
t0,x0;u
t0+δt
)− ϕ2(t0, x0)
=
∫ t0+δt
t0
[ ∂
∂t
ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s )
]
ds
+
∫ t0+δt
t0
Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, α))dBs. (57)
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Moreover, if we substitute the above equation into (56), then we obtain
ρg2t0,t0+δt
[∫ t0+δt
t0
[
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s )
]
ds
+
∫ t0+δt
t0
Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, α))dBs
]
≥ 0, (58)
which amounts to solving the following BSDE
Y 2;t0,x0;ut0 =
∫ t0+δt
t0
[
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s )
]
ds
+
∫ t0+δt
t0
Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, α))dBs
+
∫ t0+δt
t0
g2
(
s, Z2;t0,x0;us
)
ds−
∫ t0+δt
t0
Z2;t0,x0;us dBs. (59)
From Lemma 1.2, the above BSDE admits unique solutions, i.e.,
Z2;t0,x0;us = Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, α)), t0 ≤ s ≤ t0 + δt
and
Y 2;t0,x0;ut0 =
∫ t0+δt
t0
[
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s )
+ g2
(
s,Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, α))
)]
ds.
Further, if we substitute the above results in (58), we obtain∫ t0+δt
t0
[
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s )
+ g2
(
s,Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, α))
)]
ds ≥ 0. (60)
Then, dividing the above equation by δt and letting δt→ 0, we obtain
c2
(
t0, x0, α
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(t0, x0) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(t0, x0) + g2
(
t0, Dxϕ2(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, (vˆt0 , α))
)
≥ 0.
Note that, since α ∈ W is arbitrary, we can rewrite the above condition as follow
∂
∂t0
ϕ2(t0, x0) + min
α∈W
{
c2
(
t0, x0, α
)
+ Lˆαt ϕ2(t0, x0) + g2
(
t0, Dxϕ2(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, (vˆt0 , α))
)}
≥ 0,
(61)
which attains its minimum in W (which is a compact set in Rd). Thus, V w2 (·, ·) is a viscosity
subsolution of (65), with boundary condition ϕ2(T, x) = Ψ2(T, x).
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On the other hand, suppose that ϕ2 ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ]×R
d) and assume that ϕ2 ≤ V
w
2 on [0, T ]×R
d
and min(t,x)
[
V w2 (t, x)− ϕ2(t, x)
]
= 0. Then, we consider a point (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× R
d so that
ϕ2(t0, x0) = V
w
2 (t0, x0) (i.e., a local minimum at (t0, x0)). Further, for a small δt > 0, Let w˜s,
which is restricted to Σ[t0,t0+δt], be an ǫδt-optimal control for (48) at (t0, x0). Then, proceeding
in this way as (60), we obtain the following∫ t0+δt
t0
[
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , w˜s
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) + Lˆ
w˜
t ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s )
+ g2
(
s,Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, w˜s))
)]
ds ≤ ǫδt,
with u = (vˆs, w˜s). (62)
As a result of this, we also obtain the following∫ t0+δt
t0
min
α∈W
{
c2
(
s,X t0,x0;us , α
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s )
+ g2
(
s,Dxϕ2(s,X
t0,x0;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t0,x0;u
s , (vˆs, α))
)}
ds ≤ ǫδt.
(63)
Note that the mapping
(s, x, α)→
[
c2
(
s, x, α
)
+
∂
∂t
ϕ2(t, x) + Lˆ
α
t ϕ2(t, x) + g2
(
t, Dxϕ2(t, x) · σ(t, x, (vˆt, α))
)]
is continuous and, since W is compact, then s → X t0,x0;us is also continuous. As a result, the
expression under the integral in (63) is continuous. Further, if we divide both sides of (63) by
δt and letting δt→ 0, then we obtain the following
∂
∂t0
ϕ2(t0, x0) + min
α∈W
{
c2
(
t0, x0, α
)
+ Lˆαt ϕ2(t0, x0) + g2
(
t0, Dxϕ2(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, (vˆt0 , α))
)}
≤ ǫ.
(64)
Notice that, since ǫ is arbitrary, we conclude that V w2 (·, ·) is a viscosity supersolution of (47),
with boundary condition ϕ2(T, x) = Ψ2(T, x). This completes the proof of Proposition 3.5.
Remark 3.6: Note that if V w2 ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ]× R
d), then such a solution also satisfies (47) with
boundary condition V w2 (T, x) = Ψ2(T, x). Furthermore, using the verification theorem, one can
also identify V w2 as the optimal value function.
Proposition 3.7: Suppose that Proposition 3.5 holds and let ϕ2 ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ]× R
d) satisfy (40)
with ϕ2
(
T, x
)
= Ψ2(T, x) for x ∈ R
d. Then, ϕ2
(
t, x
)
≤ V w2
(
t, x
)
for any control w· ∈ W[t,T ]
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with restriction to Σ[t,T ] and for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R
d. Furthermore, if an admissible control
process wˆ· ∈ W[t,T ] exists, for almost all (s,Ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω, together with the corresponding
solution X t,x;uˆs , with uˆs = (vˆs, wˆs), and satisfies
wˆs ∈ arg inf
w·∈W[t,T ]
∣∣Σ[t,T ]
{
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
+ Lˆws ϕ2
(
s,X t,x;us
)
+g2
(
s,Dxϕ2
(
s,X t,x;us
)
· σ
(
s,X t,x;us , (vˆs, ws
)))}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,S(vˆ) with S : V[t,T ]⇒W[t,T ]
(65)
Then, ϕ2
(
t, x
)
= V wˆ2
(
t, x
)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd.
Proof: Assume that (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd is fixed. For any w· ∈ W[t,T ], restricted to Σ[t,T ], we
consider a process κ
(
s,X t,x;us
)
, with u = (vˆ, w), for s ∈ [t, T ]. Then, using Itoˆ integral formula,
we can evaluate the difference between κ
(
T,X t,x;uT
)
and κ
(
t, x
)
as follow6
κ
(
T,X t,x;uT
)
− κ
(
t, x
)
=
∫ T
t
[ ∂
∂t
κ
(
s,X t,x;us
)
+ Lˆwt κ
(
s,X t,x;us
)]
ds
+
∫ T
t
Dxκ
(
s,X t,x;us
)
· σ(s,X t,x;us , (vˆs, ws))dBs. (66)
Using (40), we further obtain the following
∂
∂t
κ
(
s,X t,x;us
)
+ Lˆwt κ
(
s,X t,x;us
)
+ c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
+ g2
(
s,Dxϕ2(s,X
t,x;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t,x;u
s , (vˆs, ws))
)
≥ 0. (67)
Further, if we combine (66) and (67), then we obtain
κ
(
t, x
)
≤ Ψ2
(
T,X t,x;uT
)
+
∫ T
t
{
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
ds
+ g2
(
s,Dxκ(s,X
t,x;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t,x;u
s , (vˆs, ws))
)}
ds
−
∫ T
t
Dxκ(s,X
t,x;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t,x;u
s , (vˆs, ws))dBs. (68)
Define Z2;t,x;us = Dxκ(s,X
t,x;u
s ) · σ(s,X
t,x;u
s , (vˆs, ws)), for s ∈ [t, T ], then κ
(
t, x
)
≤ Y 2,t,x;ut
follows, where (Y 2;t,x;u· , Z
2;t,x;u
· ) is a solution to BSDE in (20). As a result of this, we have
κ
(
t, x
)
≤ V w2
(
t, x
)
.
6Notice that κ
(
t, x
)
∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]× R
d).
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Moreover, if there exists at least one wˆ satisfying (65), then, for w = wˆ, the inequality in (68)
becomes an equality (i.e., κ(t, x) = V wˆ2
(
t, x
)
). Note that the corresponding pathwise solution
X t,x;uˆs , with uˆ = (vˆ, wˆ) and wˆ = S(vˆ), is progressively measurable, since the control process
wˆ· ∈ W[t,T ] is restricted to Σ[t,T ]. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.7.
B. On the risk-averse optimality condition for the leader
In this subsection, we provide an optimality condition on the risk-averseness of the leader in
(24) (cf. equations (26) and (13)), when the risk-averse strategy for the follower satisfies the
optimality condition of Proposition 3.7.
Proposition 3.8: Suppose that Proposition 3.7 holds. Then, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and
r ∈ [t, T ], the risk-value function w.r.t. the leader is given by
V v1
(
t, x
)
= inf
v·∈V[t,r]
∣∣Σ[t,T ] ρ
g1
t,r
[∫ r
t
c1
(
s,X t,x;us , vs
)
ds+ V v1
(
r,X t,x;ur
)]
(69)
Furthermore, if V is a compact set in Rd, then V v1
(
·, ·
)
is the viscosity solution of (39) with
boundary condition Ψ1(T, x) for x ∈ R
d.
Proof: Note that if Proposition 3.7 holds, then, for any control process v· ∈ V[t,T ], there exists
at least one w· ∈ S(v·) ⊂ W[t,T ] such that S satisfies the definition of the mapping in (65).
As a result, one can prove the above proposition (w.r.t. the operator Lvt ) in the same way as
Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.9: Suppose that Proposition 3.8 holds and let ϕ1 ∈ C
1,2
b ([0, T ]× R
d) satisfy (39)
with boundary condition ϕ1
(
T, x
)
= Ψ1(T, x) for x ∈ R
d. Then, ϕ1
(
t, x
)
≤ V v1
(
t, x
)
for any
control process v· ∈ V[t,T ] with restriction to Σ[t,T ] and for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R
d. Furthermore,
if an admissible control process v∗· ∈ V[t,T ] exists, for almost all (s,Ω) ∈ [t, T ] × Ω, together
with the corresponding solution X t,x;u∗s , with u
∗
s = (v
∗
s , S(v
∗
s)), and satisfies
v∗s ∈ arg inf
v·∈V[t,T ]
∣∣Σ[t,T ]
{
c1
(
s,X t,x;us , vs
)
+ Lvsϕ1
(
s,X t,x;us
)
+ g1
(
s,Dxϕ1
(
s,X t,x;us
)
· σ
(
s,X t,x;us , (vs, S(vs)
)))}
. (70)
Then, ϕ1
(
t, x
)
= V v∗1
(
t, x
)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd.
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Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.7, except that we require a unique solu-
tion set
{
X t,x;u· , (Y
1;t,x;u
· , Z
1;t,x;u
· ), (Y
2;t,x;u
· , Z
2;t,x;u
· )
}
for the FBSDEs in (12), (19) and (20) on(
Ω,F , P,F t
)
for every initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, with u∗s = (v
∗
s , S(v
∗
s)) and s ∈ [t, T ].
Here, we remark that the above condition in (70) requires the follower to respond optimally to
the risk-averse strategy of the leader, where such a correspondence is implicitly embedded via
the mapping S (cf. equation (65)). Furthermore, the optimal risk-averse strategies v∗· and S(v
∗
· )
are interpreted in the sense of viscosity for the corresponding risk-averse dynamic programming
equations in (48) and (69).
IV. FURTHER REMARKS
In this section, we briefly comment on the implication of our results in assessing the influence
of the leader’s decision and its risk-averse satisfaction on the risk-averseness of the follower
in relation to the direction of leader-follower information flow. Note that, for the optimization
problems in (26) and (27), if there exist: (i) a nonanticipating measurable mapping S : V[0,T ] ⇒
W[0,T ] that satisfies
ρg20,T
[
ξ20,T
(
v, S(v)
)]
≤ ρg20,T
[
ξ20,T
(
v, w
)]
, v· ∈ V[0,T ], ∀w· ∈ W[0,T ]
and (ii) a risk-averse strategy for the leader v∗· ∈ V[0,T ] that satisfies
ρg10,T
[
ξ10,T
(
v∗, S(v∗)
)]
≤ ρg10,T
[
ξ10,T
(
v, S(v)
)]
, ∀v· ∈ V[0,T ].
Then, the pair (v∗· , w
∗
· ) ∈ V[0,T ]×W[0,T ] is an optimal risk-averse strategy. Moreover, we observe
that the statement of Proposition 3.7 is implicitly accounted in Proposition 3.9. That is, for any
s ∈ [t, T ], the risk-averseness of the follower, with restriction to Σ[t,T ], i.e.,
w∗s ∈ arg inf
w·∈W[t,T ]
∣∣Σ[t,T ]
{
c2
(
s,X t,x;us , ws
)
+ Lˆws ϕ2
(
s,X t,x;us
)
+ g2
(
s,Dxϕ2
(
s,X t,x;us
)
· σ
(
s,X t,x;us , (vs, ws)
))}
is a subproblem in (70) and its solution is also given by
w∗s ∈ arg inf
w·∈Sb(v
∗
·
)
∣∣Σ[t,T ]
{
c1
(
s,X t,x;us , v
∗
s
)
+ L(v
∗,w)
s ϕ1
(
s,X t,x;us
)
+ g1
(
s,Dxϕ1
(
s,X t,x;us
)
· σ
(
s,X t,x;us , (v
∗
s , ws)
))}
,
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provided that the set of all best-responses of the follower Sb(v
∗
· ), i.e.,
Sb(v
∗
· ) ⊆
{
w· ∈ W[t,T ]
∣∣ v∗· ∈ V[t,T ] and ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T(v∗, w)]≤ ρg2t,T [ξ2t,T(v∗, wˆ)], ∀wˆ· ∈ W[t,T ]}
is nonempty. On the other hand, the risk-averse strategy for the leader is given by
v∗s ∈ arg inf
v·∈V[t,T ]
∣∣Σ[t,T ]
{
c1
(
s,X t,x;us , vs
)
+ Lvsϕ1
(
s,X0,x;us
)
+ g1
(
s,Dxϕ1
(
s,X t,x;us
)
· σ
(
s,X t,x;us , (vs, S(vs)
)))}
,
where such a strategy is also implicitly conditioned by the follower’s risk-averse strategy and
its risk-averse satisfaction. As a result of this, the follower is involved not only in minimizing
his own accumulated risk-cost (in response to the risk-averse strategy of the leader) but also
in minimizing that of the leader’s accumulated risk-cost. Hence, such an inherent interaction,
due to the nature of the problem, constitutes a constrained information flow between the leader
and that of the follower, in which the follower is required to respond optimally, in the sense of
best-response correspondence, to the risk-averse strategy of the leader.
Remark 4.1 (Comment on model uncertainty): Finally, it is worth remarking that the issue of
risk-averseness under model uncertainty, when the follower is allowed to take into account
alternative models that are statistically difficult to distinguish from (12), can be modeled as
an “min-max” optimization problem with uncertainty aversion. For example, if we replace Bt
with (B̂t +
∫ t
0
hsds) in (12), where h ∈ C
1,2
b
(
[0, T ];Rd
)
is a measurable function and B̂t is
a d-dimensional brownian motion. Then, the process h can be used as a device to transform
P into another probability distribution Q which is mutually absolutely continuous w.r.t. P on(
Ω,F
)
(e.g., see Girsavov [28] for additional discussions on transforming stochastic processes).
Moreover, if we specify the model uncertainty in terms of the relative entropy between Q and P
as a single constraint on the entire path of perturbation. Then, by considering h as an adversarial
control process in a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game (in the sense of Elliot and
Kalton [29]), we can reformulate the optimization problem in (22) as an “min-max” problem
with uncertainty-aversion between the follower and that of the adversary (e.g., see [30] or [31]
for related discussions, but in a different context).
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